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poses. On February 16, Los Angeles County
Superior Court Judge Robert O'Brien ruled
that CHBPA's legislative advocacy efforts
for the benefit of horsemen, generally or
specifically, constitute services rendered
to horsemen and fall within the purview of
CHBPA's authority relating to the expenditure of its funds; further, the court found
that CHRB may not limit or control
CHBPA's allocation of such funds (see
MAJOR PROJECTS).
In its decision, the court addressed two
key issues raised by the parties. On CHBPA's
first amendment claim. Judge O'Brien
stated that "legalized horse racing is subject
to all-encompassing government regulation;
that such regulation is necessary to carry out
the public policy of only allowing such gambling in a controlled, limited and monitored
fashion...; that the section 19613 monies
received by [CHBPA], which are derived
from a portion of wagers placed on legalized
horse races, are subject to statutes regulating
horse racing; [and] that although [CHBPA]
does have First Amendment rights, the regulation of its use of section 19613 monies
to ensure that such monies are used for statutorily authorized purposes does not violate
[CHBPA's] First Amendment rights." As to
whether the section 19613 funds expended
by CHBPA are "compulsory fees" as that
term has been used in cases like Keller v.
State Barof Californiaand Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, Judge O'Brien found
that "the monies received by [CHBPA] pursuant to section 19613(b), a percentage of
wagers made on legalized horse races, are
not compulsory fees; that such monies are
not voluntary contributions by [CHBPA's]
members; that such monies are derived from
a source that never belonged to any individual member of the CHBPA; that the expenditure of such monies does not directly
affect any member's individual claims to
the funds because if the funds are not
expended, no member directly receives
any monetary benefit; [and] that the benefits, claims and interests of CHBPA
members to section 19613 funds, if any,
are attenuated from any tangible and direct
claim of members, including [the dissident CHBPA members]."
Accordingly, the court vacated that part
of CHRB's November 18, 1993 order
which prohibited CHBPA from expending
funds for legislative advocacy, and that
part of its modified February 3, 1994 order
which prohibited CHBPA from spending
more than 5% of its annual budget on
legislative advocacy without CHRB approval. CHRB is currently appealing the
court's ruling; however, the court's order
is in effect pending the appeal.
In January, attorney Ron Zumbrun
filed a suit in Sacramento County Superior
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Court against CHRB and members of the
quarter horse industry; in RonaldandAnn
Zumbrun v. CHRB, et al., No. 376925,
plaintiffs allege that California racing law
requires CHRB to assure equality between
breeds, and that the named defendants failed
to provide parity and equality for harness
racing at Los Alamitos in 1993 and 1994.

*

RECENT MEETINGS

At its April 28 meeting, the Board presented former Commissioner Rosemary
Ferraro with a resolution of commendation for her service as a CHRB member
from 1986 to 1994.

*

FUTURE MEETINGS
May 20 in Cypress.
June 24 in Sacramento.
July 28 in La Jolla.
August 26 in Del Mar.

NEW MOTOR VEHICLE
BOARD
Executive Secretary:
Sam W. Jennings
(916) 445-1888

P

ursuant to Vehicle Code section 3000
et seq., the New Motor Vehicle Board
(NMVB) licenses new motor vehicle dealerships and regulates dealership relocations and manufacturer terminations of
franchises. It reviews disciplinary action
taken against dealers by the Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV). Most licensees
deal in cars or motorcycles.
NMVB is authorized to adopt regulations to implement its enabling legislation; the Board's regulations are codified
in Chapter 2, Division i, Title 13 of the
California Code of Regulations (CCR).
The Board also handles disputes arising
out of warranty reimbursement schedules.
After servicing or replacing parts in a car
under warranty, a dealer is reimbursed by
the manufacturer. The manufacturer sets
reimbursement rates which a dealer occasionally challenges as unreasonable. Infrequently, the manufacturer's failure to
compensate the dealer for tests performed
on vehicles is questioned.
In March, Governor Wilson announced
his appointment of Alan Skobin to NMVB;
Skobin, a Republic from Chatsworth, is employed by an automotive and real estate
investment company. Also in March, the
Governor announced the reappointment of
Stephen Wittman to NMVB; Wittman, a
Republican from Poway, is the senior managing partner in a law firm and has served
on NMVB since 1992.

U

MAJOR PROJECTS

Protest/Petition Actions. Following
the Sixth District Court of Appeal's December 1993 ruling that it did not properly
consider and adopt the administrative law
judge's (ALJ) proposed decision in the
franchise termination dispute between
Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc.
(MMSA) and Automotive Management
Group, which does business as Santa Cruz
Mitsubishi (SCM) [14:1 CRLR 163-64],
NMVB reconsidered the proposed opinion on remand and adopted it on April 1.
This dispute arose due to a letter dated
January 9, 1990, in which MMSA gave
notice to SCM of its intention to terminate
SCM's franchise; the sole ground listed
for termination by MMSA was SCM's
alleged failure to maintain the unrestricted
availability of lines of credit as set forth in
the Dealer Development Plan. This notice
of termination was later rescinded by
MMSA after SCM committed to reacquire
an unrestricted line of credit.
In a letter dated October 18, 1990,
MMSA again advised SCM of its intentions to terminate the franchise agreement,
this time due to SCM's alleged failure to
maintain a flooring line of credit. A copy
of this notice was received by both SCM
and NMVB on October 22, 1990; this
letter specified that the termination date
would be January 21, 199 1.
In late September or early October of
1990, SCM began negotiations with North
Bay Ford Lincoln-Mercury (North Bay) in
an attempt to reach an agreement under
which North Bay would purchase the assets of the Mitsubishi business from SCM;
SCM advised MMSA about these ongoing
negotiations. MMSA wrote a memorandum to SCM, dated January 17, 1991, in
which it reiterated the fact that the franchise was scheduled for termination on
January 21, 1991; however, MMSA further stated that it would be willing to consider the pending buy/sell agreement with
North Bay, as long as MMSA received
specified documentation by January 31,
1991. In a letter dated January 29, 1991,
SCM advised MMSA that North Bay had
backed out of the agreement to purchase
the assets of SCM; this letter was not
received by MMSA until February 5,
1991. By this time, MMSA had already
disconnected SCM from its computerized
dealer network.
On March 6, 1991, NMVB received a
document which purported to be SCM's
protest to the proposed termination of its
franchise. On March 18, 1991, NMVB
received MMSA's motion to dismiss. In
this motion, MMSA asserted that NMVB
does not have jurisdiction to consider
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SCM protest because the protest was not
received within the statutory time limits as
set forth in Vehicle Code section 3060. On
March 21, 1991, SCM filed its opposition
to the motion to dismiss, in which SCM
argued that MMSA should be estopped
from asserting application of the time limitations contained in Vehicle Code section
3060 due to specified conduct on the part
of representatives of MMSA. On August
19, 1991, after considering the records,
pleadings, evidence, and oral arguments,
an ALJ filed an order rejecting the protest
for filing; pursuant to this order, the protest was not received by NMVB within the
applicable statutory time period, and insufficient evidence was presented to establish that MMSA should be estopped
from asserting the lack of a timely protest.
On September 19, 1991, SCM filed a
petition for writ of administrative mandamus in Santa Cruz County Superior Court,
challenging the ALJ's order rejecting the
protest for filing; the court denied the petition for writ of mandamus on April 27,
1992. On appeal, the Sixth District Court
of Appeal reversed the judgment of the
superior court and remanded the matter to
NMVB. In reaching its decision, the Sixth
District concluded that the "ALJ's decision regarding the timeliness of the protest
should have been submitted to the Board
for review. Accordingly, the matter is remanded so that the Board may have an
opportunity to consider this issue."
The sole issue presented to NMVB was
whether the evidence supports a finding
that MMSA made representations to SCM
regarding the proposed termination such
that SCM's reasonable reliance on MMSA's
alleged representations caused SCM to
delay in filing a protest to a point beyond
the statutory period as set forth in Vehicle
Code section 3060. According to the
ALJ's proposed order, which was adopted
by NMVB on April 1, Vehicle Code section 3060(b) requires that any protest to a
notice of termination be filed with NMVB
within thirty days of the franchisee's receipt of the notice. The document which
purported to be SCM's protest was not
received by NMVB until March 6, 1991.
NMVB also found insufficient evidence
to support the notion that MMSA made
representations upon which SCM could
have reasonably relied, causing SCM to
fail to file a timely protest.
On February 3, in Jim Lynch Cadillac
v. CadillacMotor Car Division, General
Motors Corporation(Petition No. P-23692), NMVB adopted a modified version of
a proposed ALJ ruling. Under its ruling,
NMVB found that Jim Lynch Cadillac
(Lynch) is collaterally estopped from
relitigating its allegation that Cadillac

Motor Car Division's (Cadillac) conduct
was the ultimate cause of Lynch's franchise termination, because Lynch had an
opportunity to litigate the matter in an
earlier protest dealing with the original
termination. [14:1 CRLR 164]
The original dispute arose after Lynch
entered into a dealer sales agreement with
Cadillac on December 17, 1986 and acquired the facilities of the former Buffington Motors, Inc. in Inglewood; the dealer
agreement was subject to the provision
that Lynch obtain a suitable site and relocate the dealership within one year. After
five years of searching, Lynch was unable
to find a relocation site acceptable to Cadillac. Without prior approval by Cadillac,
Lynch then abandoned the facility and
consolidated his Cadillac new car sales
operation with another dealership in Inglewood. Seven months later, on October
7, 1991, Cadillac gave notice of its intent
to terminate Lynch's dealership.
This led up to the original dispute between the two parties (Protest No. 124191), in which Lynch defended against the
termination by offering to show evidence
that its unauthorized relocation was the
result of factors beyond its control, including the conduct and representations of
Cadillac. In the original dispute, NMVB
found that "Lynch was completely in
charge of his own relocation efforts which
were numerous. For the most part, Cadillac cooperated with Lynch in these efforts...." NMVB also found that Lynch
was the one who unilaterally breached its
dealer agreement by moving its new car
dealership without obtaining Cadillac's
approval. [12:4 CRLR 223]
In the present action, Lynch reasserts
its argument that Cadillac failed to continue to support Lynch's relocation and
alleges that Cadillac knew there were no
suitable sites for relocation in the Inglewood area, and seeks $4 million in general
damages for breach of contract and breach
of the implied covenant of fair dealing.
NMVB found that Lynch's breach of contract claims are clearly precluded by collateral estoppel, noting that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel not only serves to bar
relitigation of those issues which have
been actually litigated, but also those that
could have been put forth but were not.
NMVB found that Lynch had the opportunity to litigate the breach of contract
claims in the earlier action and thus is now
barred from raising those issues now.
On April 1, in Friendly Chevrolet v.
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet
Motor Division (Protest No. PR-unassigned), NMVB adopted an ALJ decision
finding that Friendly's purported protest
failed to comply with NMVB regulations
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set forth in sections 553.1, 584, 585, 594,
595, and 597, Title 13 of the CCR; because
Friendly's submittal did not meet these
requirements, NMVB did not have authority to accept the filing as a protest and now
the statutory filing period has elapsed.
This dispute arose when Friendly received a notice on December 21, 1993 of
General Motors' intent to relocate an existing American Chevrolet-Geo dealership in Modesto to a location within ten
miles of Friendly's location. On January
3, 1994, NMVB received a letter from
Friendly's counsel dated December 30,
1993, advising NMVB that it had received
notice of General Motors' intent to relocate and that the letter was intended to
serve as a formal protest. However, the
letter did not conform to NMVB's form
and content requirements as set forth in the
CCR; the letter also did not contain the
required filing fee as set forth in section
553.1. On or about January 26, Friendly's
counsel telephoned NMVB to determine
the status of the purported protest; NMVB
staff responded that the December letter
did not comply with the requirements of
Title 13 and that no action had been taken.
On January 27, Friendly submitted a
formal request that the NMVB Secretary
accept the December 30 letter together
with an amended protest by which
Friendly intended to cure the defects in the
letter; NMVB received these documents
on January 28. General Motors filed a
notice of motion to reject on February 7;
Friendly filed its opposition papers on
February 9. In its defense, Friendly stated
that the purported protest of December 30
constituted a valid protest in substance, if
not in form, and that General Motors will
not be prejudiced if the purported protest
is accepted. Friendly argued that while
ignorance of the law is not an excuse,
NMVB's staff did not advise it that its
protest was not in proper form until its
counsel telephoned the Board on January
26. General Motors argued that the December 30 purported protest did not meet
NMVB's requirements and was not, therefore, a valid protest; since the Secretary
was not asked to accept the purported protest until after the 20-day period for filing
protests had expired on January 10, General Motors contended that the Board
lacks jurisdiction to accept the protest.
The ALJ and NMVB found that under
section 598 of Title 13, the Secretary may,
for good cause shown, accept for filing
any papers "that do not comply with these
regulations...." However, this regulation
does not authorize the Secretary to accept
a protest after the statutory time for filing
has elapsed. According to NMVB, a request for acceptance of a non-conforming
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paper must be made, in the case of protests, before the statutory deadline is
reached. Since the filing deadline past on
January 10, and Friendly did not request
the Secretary to accept the purported protest prior to that deadline, the Secretary is
without discretionary authority to accept
the purported protest.
Board Proposes Fee Increase. On
April 15, NMVB published notice of its
intent to amend section 553, Title 13 of the
CCR, in order to comply with the requirements of Vehicle Code section 3016; specifically, this amendment proposes to increase the fee charged to licensees subject
to the jurisdiction of NMVB. According
to NMVB, this increase is necessary to
comply with section 3016, which requires
that licensees be charged fees sufficient to
fully fund NMVB's activities. At this writing, NMVB is scheduled to hold a public
hearing on this proposed amendment on
May 31 in Sacramento.
Other Board Rulemaking. On December 15, NMVB published notice of its
intent to amend sections 585 and 598 and
adopt new section 593.1, Title 13 of the
CCR, regarding the duties and procedures
which the NMVB Executive Secretary must
follow in accepting and filing protests. [14:1
CRLR 163] NMVB held a public hearing on
this proposed rulemaking on February 14;
in response to some of the comments,
NMVB modified the rulemaking package
and released the revised text for an additional 15-day public comment period. At
its April 15 meeting, NMVB adopted the
proposed changes, which await review
and approval by the Office of Administrative Law.

U

LEGISLATION
AB 3539 (Speier). Existing law defines a buying and selling service, for the
purposes of specified provisions of the
Insurance Code related to motor clubs, as
an arrangement by a motor club whereby
the holder of a service contract with the
club is aided in any way in the purchase or
sale of an automobile. As amended May
16, this bill would require an advertisement to disclose specified information, if
the advertisement is of a service offered
by a motor club to refer members to a new
motor vehicle dealer for the purchase of a
new motor vehicle and if the dealer pays
the motor club an advertising, promotional, or marketing fee.
Existing law defines the term "dealer"
for purposes of the Vehicle Code as,
among other things, a person who is engaged in the business of selling vehicles.
This bill would define the term "brokering" for purposes of the Vehicle Code as
an arrangement under which a dealer, for
12

consideration, provides the service of arranging, negotiating, assisting, or effecting the purchase of a motor vehicle, not
owned by the dealer, for another or others.
Existing law specifies exemptions
from the definition of the term "broker"
for purposes of the Vehicle Code. This bill
would add to the exemptions a motor club,
as defined, that refers members to a new
motor vehicle dealer for the purchase of a
new motor vehicle and does not receive a
fee from the dealer contingent upon the
sale of the vehicle.
Existing law makes it a misdemeanor
for a dealer to, among other things, advertise or offer for sale or exchange any vehicle not actually for sale at the premises
of the dealer or available to the dealer from
the manufacturer or distributor of the vehicle at the time of the advertisement or
offer. Existing law makes an exception to
that provision by authorizing a dealer to
advertise that it has the ability to purchase
for resale vehicles available from franchised dealers, if the advertisement or
offer states, among other things, that the
dealer is not franchised to sell new vehicles, and that the vehicles must be purchased as used. This bill would delete the
exception specified above and would instead authorize an autobroker to advertise
its service of arranging or negotiating the
purchase of a new motor vehicle from a
franchised new motor vehicle dealer. The
bill would limit the content of the advertisements, require a specified disclosure
statement, and specify the type, size, and
placement of that disclosure.
Existing law makes it a misdemeanor
for a dealer to, among other things, advertise for sale as new any new vehicle of a
line-make for which the dealer does not
hold a franchise. This bill would, in addition, make it a misdemeanor for a dealer
to sell the specified vehicle.
Existing law makes it a misdemeanor
for any motor vehicle manufacturer, manufacturer branch, distributor, or distributor
branch to do specified acts relating to
motor vehicle dealers. This bill would
make it a misdemeanor for any motor vehicle manufacturer, manufacturer branch,
distributor, or distributor branch to dishonor a warranty, rebate, or other incentive offered to the public or a dealer in
connection with the retail sale of a new
motor vehicle, based solely on the fact that
an autobroker arranged or negotiated the
sale. [A. W&M]
AB 3333 (Speier). The Tanner Consumer Protection Act provides for a thirdparty dispute resolution process with respect to motor vehicle sales; existing law
also requires each new motor vehicle manufacturer to establish or make available to

buyers or lessees of new motor vehicles a
qualified third-party dispute resolution
process. As amended May 12, this bill
would repeal the third-party dispute resolution provisions, substantially revise related provisions, and establish a comprehensive "lemon law arbitration program"
in the Department of Consumer Affairs
(DCA); the bill would require DCA to contract with one or more private entities to
conduct arbitration proceedings in order
to settle disputes between buyers and sellers. [A. W&M]
The following is a status update on
bills reported in detail in CRLR Vol. 14,
No. I (Winter 1994) at page 163:
SB 1081 (Calderon). Under existing
law, every conditional sales contract, defined to include certain contracts for the
sale or bailment of a motor vehicle, is
required to contain certain disclosures, as
specified. As amended May 26, 1993, this
bill would establish a seller's right of rescission based on the seller's inability to
assign the contract, and would require the
right of rescission to be included in conditional sales contracts. The bill would specify the conditions under which the seller
may rescind a contract, including requiring the seller to send a Notice of Cancellation to the buyer, as specified; however,
the bill would specify circumstances in
which, after rescission, the seller may repossess the vehicle without notice. The
bill would provide that a seller is liable in
a civil action to a buyer for any damages
caused by an unauthorized rescission. The
bill would prohibit conditional sales contracts from containing a seller's right of
rescission based on inability to assign the
contract, except as provided by the bill.
Existing law prohibits various activities in connection with the advertising or
sale of motor vehicles by, among others,
vehicle dealers licensed by the Department of Motor Vehicles. This bill would
prohibit a licensed dealer from rescinding
a contract for the sale of a vehicle and
subsequently engaging in any unlawful,
unfair, or deceptive act or practice, as
specified, or stating an intent to rescind a
contract pursuant to the right of rescission
provided by the bill without having the
ability to comply with the requirements of
the bill.
The bill would state that the provisions
regarding conditional sales contracts only
apply to contracts entered into on or after
January 1, 1994. [A. Desk]
The following bills died in committee:
AB 699 (Bowen), which would have
changed the name of NMVB to the Franchise Dispute Resolution Board and enlarged the Board's scope of authority to
include regulation of all franchisee-
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franchisor relationships; AB 802 (Sher),
which would have prohibited a licensed
vehicle dealer from advertising the amount
or percentage of any down payment, the
number of payments or period of repayment, the amount of any payment, or the
amount of any finance charge without
making clear and conspicuous disclosure
of specified information; and AB 1665
(Napolitano), which would have prohibited any manufacturer, manufacturer
branch, distributor, or distributor branch
licensed under the Vehicle Code from preventing adealerfrom selling and servicing
new motor vehicles of any line-make, or
parts and products related to those vehicles, at the same established place of business approved for sale and service of new
motor vehicles by any other manufacturer,
manufacturer branch, distributor, or distributor branch, if the established place of
business is sufficient to enable competitive selling and servicing of all new motor
vehicles, parts, and other products sold
and serviced at that established place of
business.
RECENT MEETINGS
At its April 1 meeting, the Board
elected Manning Post to serve as NMVB
President and Lucille Mazeika to serve as
Vice-President.
*

*

FUTURE MEETINGS
June 14 in Los Angeles.
July 15 in Los Angeles.

OSTEOPATHIC
MEDICAL BOARD OF

CALIFORNIA
Executive Director:
Linda Bergmann
(916) 322-4306
n 1922, California voters approved a
constitutional initiative which created
the Board of Osteopathic Examiners;
1991 legislation changed the Board's
name to the Osteopathic Medical Board of
California (OMBC). Today, pursuant to
Business and Professions Code section
3600 et seq., OMBC regulates entry into
the osteopathic profession, examines and
approves schools and colleges of osteopathic medicine, and enforces professional standards. The Board is empowered
to adopt regulations to implement its enabling legislation; OMBC's regulations
are codified in Division 16, Title 16 of the
California Code of Regulations (CCR).
The 1922 initiative, which provided for a
five-member Board consisting of practic-

ing doctors of osteopathy (DOs), was
amended in 1982 to include two public
members. The Board now consists of
seven members, appointed by the Governor, serving staggered three-year terms.
On April 27, Governor Wilson appointed William J. Evans, DO, of Roseville to the Board. Dr. Evans is an anesthesiologist for the Permanente Medical
Group. Even with Dr. Evans' appointment, the Board still has two vacanciesone public member position and one physician position.

U

MAJOR PROJECTS

Board Shuts Down Enforcement Program. As predicted last fall, OMBC shut
down its enforcement program in January
due to lack of funding. [14:1 CRLR 164-65]
Thus, serious complaints against DOs are
not being investigated, and the Board has
slowed or suspended work on at least a
dozen pending disciplinary cases.
The Board blames its budget woes on
the legislature, which enacted budget language in 1991 which required the transfer
of over $500,000 in DO licensing fees
from the Board's reserve fund to the state
general fund. OMBC also asserts that its
budget has been cut in each of the past two
years, and it has incurred deficits in both
of those years but has no reserve funds to
cover the deficit. This year, the Board projects another deficit of at least $100,000.
At this writing, an urgency fee increase
bill is pending in the legislature (see LEGISLATION).
Rulemaking Update. OMBC's proposed amendments to sections 1600,
1602, 1668, 1620, 1621, 1656, 1690, and
Article 18, Title 16 of the CCR, were
approved by the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) on September 22, 1993; to
date, OAL has not published notice of that
approval in its CaliforniaRegulatory Notice Register, although the changes have
been incorporated into the CCR. These
changes, which were adopted by OMBC
at its May 1993 meeting, change references to the Board of Osteopathic Examiners to the Osteopathic Medical Board of
California, in accordance with the Board's
recent name change; delete a reference to
a 75% pass rate for the Board's written examination; provide that a petition for reinstatement shall not be heard by the Board
unless the time elapsed from the effective
date of the original disciplinary decision
or from the date of the denial meets the
requirements of Business and Professions
Code section 2307; and increase the
Board's examination fee from $125 to
$350, its duplicate certificate fee from $10
to $25, its annual tax and registration fee
from $175 to $200, and its delinquent
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annual tax and registration fee from
$87.50 to $100. [14:1 CRLR 165; 13:4
CRLR 2021
On March 23, OAL approved OMBC's
amendments to sections 1635 and 1641,
Title 16 of the CCR, which were adopted
by the Board at its October 1993 meeting.
Among other things, the changes authorize American Osteopathic Association
(AOA) Category I-B continuing medical
education (CME) hours, and delete the
annual CME requirement of twenty hours,
leaving in place the requirement for 150
hours of CME in a three-year period with
60 hours being AOA CME and 90 hours
being either AOA or American Medical
Association CME hours. [13:2&3 CRLR
209]
*LEGISLATION
AB 3732 (Alby). Existing law requires
OMBC to require each licensed osteopathic physician to demonstrate satisfaction of its CME requirements as a condition for renewal of a license. As amended
April 14, this bill would provide that commencing January 1, 1995, OMBC instead
require each licensed osteopathic physician to complete a minimum of 150 AOA
Category I-A CME hours, as defined, during each three-year cycle as a condition for
renewal of a license.
Existing law establishes fees for examinations, taxes, and registration as licensed osteopathic physicians and requires these fees to be deposited in the
Osteopathic Medical Board of California
Contingent Fund, a continuously appropriated fund. Under existing law, the annual tax and registration fee to be set by
OMBC may not exceed $200, and the fee
for failure to timely pay the annual tax and
registration fee is 50% of the renewal fee
but not more than $100. This bill would
increase the maximum amount for the tax
and registration fee to $300, and would
change the penalty fee to provide that it
may not exceed $150. To prevent further
expropriations of its licensing fees by the
legislature (see MAJOR PROJECTS), this
bill would also provide that any and all
fees received by OMBC shall be for the
sole purpose of the operation of the Board.
This bill also provides that effective July
1, 1999, the fee increases in this bill would
be repealed, and would reestablish the fee
requirements under existing law. [A.
W&M]
AB 3125 (Aguiar), as amended April
19, would recognize the need to emphasize the practice of primary care medicine
and establish a pilot project at the College
of Osteopathic Medicine of the Pacific
(COMP) that would combine medical
school education and residency training in

